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Hugh White  
New Zealand‘s Defence White Paper 2010 acknowledges that shifting power relativities in Asia 
are undermining the regional order that has kept New Zealand secure for many decades.  This 
raises questions about whether New Zealand can continue to assume that the New Zealand 
Defence Force (NZDF) need not prepare for major conflict.  The White Paper provides little 
analysis of what this possibility means for the kinds of tasks the NZDF might be called upon to 
perform and what capabilities it might therefore need in future.  This article explores these 
questions by looking at the kinds of broad strategic posture New Zealand might adopt in a more 
contested Asia, what demands those postures might make on its forces, and the capability 
implications. 
Back in 2000, New Zealand‘s Clark Government made a bold call.  It judged 
that New Zealand was very unlikely to find itself fighting old-fashioned inter-
state wars in future.  It argued that such wars were inherently unlikely in the 
post Cold War international system, and particularly in the regions of the 
Western Pacific were New Zealand strategic interests were most directly 
engaged.  As a result, Helen Clark shifted New Zealand‘s capability priorities 
decisively away from forces suited to interstate war, towards forces suited to 
interventions in intrastate conflicts, of the kind that had become common 
over the decade before 2000, and have become even more common since. 
This core strategic judgement was not by any means unique to Wellington, 
but New Zealand was different because Helen Clark actually followed its 
implications in setting defence priorities, whereas others talked about a new 
strategic era but kept building forces for conventional wars.  Clark‘s more 
tough-minded approach has served New Zealand well so far.  As she 
predicted, New Zealand has felt called upon to intervene in intra-state 
conflicts near and far.  By focusing on capabilities most appropriate for these 
operations—essentially the Army—Wellington has been able to achieve New 
Zealand‘s strategic objectives while keeping the Defence budget relatively 
low.  So it has been a successful policy. 
But will it keep being successful?  This was the core question for the new 
Defence White Paper commissioned by the Key government.  Could New 
Zealand continue to assume that the kind of defence posture it had adopted 
in 2000 would serve it well in coming decades?   Was it still reasonable to 
assume that, for New Zealand at least, conventional wars are a thing of the 
past, and if not, what are New Zealand‘s options? 
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To the government‘s credit, the Defence White Paper 2010 published by the 
Key Government in November 2010,
1
 and the earlier Defence Assessment 
which informed it,
2
 acknowledged the significance of these questions and 
went some way to address them.  Perhaps not surprisingly, however, they 
did not come up with very clear answers.  This essay explores the answers 
they did give, and considers what fuller and more detailed responses might 
be possible. 
Defence Policy and Regional Order   
We should start by stepping back a little to explore some of the issues in a 
general way.  Any country‘s defence policy is determined to a significant 
degree by judgements about the future of the international system of which it 
is part.  The kinds of wars we might fight and hence the kinds of forces we 
need depend on the nature of relationships between states and the role of 
force in managing them.  Many governments were confident that after the 
Cold War the international system had changed fundamentally to reduce the 
role of force in relations between states.  They argued that no powerful 
country would have either the capacity or the inclination to contest the US-
led globalised world order that emerged from the end of the Cold War.  As a 
result the core of the international system would remain stable, and 
disturbances would come from the periphery.  The terrorist attacks of 2001 
reinforced this judgement and reminded people of how substantial threats 
from the margins of the international system could be. 
But the preoccupation with terrorism and the War on Terror also distracted 
attention from a major development which was undermining the stability core 
of the international order itself.  The China‘s economic rise is reshaping 
political and strategic relations between the world‘s two most powerful 
states.  China has a real chance of overtaking America economically with a 
few decades, and Beijing has made it increasingly clear that China will not 
passively continue to accept the current US-led order as its power grows. 
China‘s challenge is particularly focused on the Asia-Pacific region.  For the 
past forty years China has accepted US leadership in Asia, underpinning a 
remarkable era of stability and progress.  Now China is challenging 
American leadership, and America is pushing back. If this continues, Asia‘s 
stable order will be disrupted by intense strategic completion.  This would 
affect the whole of the Western Pacific. 
Of course none of this is inevitable.  China might stop growing economically, 
it might drop its challenge to American leadership, or Beijing and 
                                                 
1
 New Zealand Government, Defence White Paper 2010 (Wellington: Ministry of Defence, 
November 2010). 
2
 New Zealand Ministry of Defence, Defence Assessment, July 2010, 
<http://www.defence.govt.nz/pdfs/defence-review-2009-released-defence-assessment-july-
2010.pdf> [Accessed 8 March 2011]. 
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Washington might reach an accommodation.  But none of these is certain or 
even likely.  China‘s economy, its military power and its challenge to 
American leadership will probably all keep growing, and so will America‘s 
response.  There is a serious risk that this will profoundly affect security 
throughout Asia—including New Zealand‘s.  Helen Clark‘s confidence that 
New Zealand would not face serious conventional military threats no doubt 
reflected her optimistic reading of broader trends in the nature of global 
order, but in reality it reflected an extrapolation from the decades of peace in 
Asia since the Vietnam War which has been underwritten on American 
primacy.  Now as power shifts away from America the risks to New Zealand 
grow.  New Zealand has always recognised that distant events can affect its 
interests at home; that may prove to be as true in the present century as it 
was in the last one. 
This poses new challenges for New Zealand, and for Australia, which go 
beyond questions of policy to issues of identity.  Both countries remain 
vestiges of the great Western, and especially ‗Anglo-Saxon‘, maritime 
empire in the Western Pacific.  America has sustained Western power in 
Asia for half a century after the empires themselves evaporated.  As a result, 
neither Australia nor New Zealand has ever seriously considered how we 
would defend our interests and secure our countries in a region which was 
not dominated by our great and powerful Anglo-Saxon friends.  If China 
grows to overtake the United States economically, five centuries of Western 
strategic domination of the Western Pacific—the Vasco da Gama Era—will 
finally pass.   So both countries are entering new and unchartered territory.
3
 
What the Defence White Paper 2010 Said 
The most striking aspect of Defence White Paper 2010 is the relatively clear 
way it acknowledged these shifting fundamentals in New Zealand‘s situation.  
Chapter Three, headed ‗New Zealand‘s Strategic Outlook to 2035‘, went 
straight to the point. 
The central theme of this chapter is that of an increasingly uncertain 
strategic outlook. The international order which has served us well is under 
pressure, and it seems likely that the next 25 years will be more challenging 
than the 25 years just past.
4
   
A little later it explains: 
The underlying stability and predictability which has characterised 
international relations since at least the end of the Cold War is now being 
tested. Economic weight is shifting.
5
  
                                                 
3
 For a fuller account of these arguments about Asia‘s future see Hugh White, ‗Why War in Asia 
Remains Thinkable‘, Survival, vol. 50, no. 6 (December 2008–January 2009), pp. 85-104.  
4
 New Zealand Government, Defence White Paper 2010, para 3.2.   
5
 Ibid., para 3.5. 
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This judgment is expanded later in the chapter: 
The strategic balance in North Asia is shifting. China both benefits from and 
contributes to regional stability and prosperity, but there will be a natural 
tendency for it to define and pursue its interests in a more forthright way on 
the back of growing wealth and power. The pace of China‘s military 
modernisation and force projection programme, and the response this could 
prompt from neighbouring states, may test the relationships of the major 
regional powers.
6
 
Predictably, and perhaps understandably, the White Paper was less clear 
about the implications of this shift for New Zealand‘s strategic position.  The 
concluding section of the chapter said:  
New Zealand faces an increasingly uncertain strategic outlook over the next 
25 years… 
It is highly unlikely that New Zealand will face a direct military threat, but 
other significant security events are possible. New Zealand needs to be alert 
to unseen risks, and maintain depth and resilience in our military 
capabilities. 
The wider international context is also changing, and not necessarily to our 
advantage. The international order and institutions which have served us 
well are under pressure… 
All of these factors directly impact on how the Government expects to use 
the NZDF [New Zealand Defence Force] over the next 25 years, as 
described in the next chapter.
7
 
In fact Chapter 4, Tasks for the NZDF, does little to explain what the 
implications of these vaguely-defined uncertainties are for New Zealand‘s 
defence needs.  Among the ‗principal tasks‘ it lists for the NDF are ―to defend 
New Zealand‘s sovereignty‖, ―to discharge our obligations as an ally of 
Australia‖, ―to make a credible contribution in support of peace and stability 
in the Asia-Pacific region‖, and ―to be prepared to respond to sudden shifts 
and other disjunctions in the strategic environment‖.
8
    
As these tasks are explained later in the chapter, some major questions are 
raised and left unanswered about what New Zealand‘s forces may be called 
upon to do if Asia‘s order is indeed disrupted in the years ahead.  For 
example, it says that in order to defend New Zealand‘s sovereignty,  
The NZDF needs to maintain a military capability in the land and maritime 
environs of New Zealand sufficient to indicate that we would act to deter a 
potential aggressor and to provide time for any international assistance that 
might be sought by us.
9
 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., para 3.52. 
7
 Ibid., paras 3.69-3.72. 
8
 Ibid., para 4.8.  
9
 Ibid., para 4.10. 
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The White Paper does not explain what this might require of the NZDF in 
practical operational terms.  Likewise when it describes what would be 
required to support the alliance with Australia, Chapter Four slides into 
generalities and gives no guidance about the kinds of operations that NZDF 
might be called upon to undertake as Australia‘s ally. And the text lists a 
number of things that its says could be done either by diplomatic or military 
means to support peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region , thereby 
neatly evading the question of  what the NZDF itself needs to be able to 
do.
10
 
But towards the end of the chapter the implications of today‘s strategic 
uncertainties for New Zealand‘s defence needs are addressed a little more 
clearly. It makes a number of quite specific points about the how New 
Zealand should decide what forces it needs.  First, it says priority should be 
given to forces for operations in New Zealand‘s ―maritime zone‖ and the 
South Pacific.
11
  Second, it says the NZDF should be ―largely optimised‖ for 
conflicts in fragile, failing or failed states, because these are most common.
12
  
Third, while noting that the cost of capabilities suited to high-end conflict 
between strong militaries is ―increasingly beyond our means‖,
13
 the 
possibility that a New Zealand government might want to contribute militarily 
to ―traditional interstate conflict‖ cannot be excluded: 
We therefore have, and should retain, some particular high-end capabilities 
which would enable the NZDF to play a meaningful role in an inter-state 
conflict.
14
   
These ideas are developed a little further in Chapter 5, which talks about the 
demands of higher-level operations in these terms: 
Operations beyond our immediate region are likely to involve the NZDF in 
higher-intensity environments. We must therefore have capabilities which 
can be integrated with, and operate alongside, our international partners in 
such operations. 
New Zealand‘s contributions beyond our region will ordinarily be scaled to 
the size of the NZDF. Their operational and diplomatic value will be 
assessed by where they sit on the scale of military credibility. Having 
effective combat capabilities is therefore critical.
15
 
What these ‗combat capabilities‘, by which the White Paper seems to mean 
capabilities for higher-intensity conflicts, might be is spelled out in a separate 
section.  They include army land combat units, special forces, the upgraded 
ANZAC frigates and presumably P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft.
16
  The 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., paras 4.13-4.16, 4.22-4.24. 
11
 Ibid., para 4.34. 
12
 Ibid., para 4.38. 
13
 Ibid., para 4.37. 
14
 Ibid., para 4.40. 
15
 Ibid., paras 5.4, 5.5. 
16
 Ibid., paras 5.46-5.49. 
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White Paper commits the NZ Government to maintain and develop these 
capabilities, but not substantially to add to them.  
Is this Good Enough? 
The core question in evaluating New Zealand‘s White Paper is whether this 
response to the risks now emerging in New Zealand‘s wider strategic 
environment is sufficient.  This is not the kind of question to which there is 
necessarily a straightforward answer.  The complexities are well described in 
the Defence Assessment; 
New Zealand‘s assessment of the strategic environment suggests there will 
be further instability in the future. As an ultimate expression of uncertainty, 
major shifts have been, and will continue to be, a feature of the security 
landscape. A paradigm-shifting event will almost certainly lead to a more 
dangerous security situation for which, by definition, we will not be fully 
prepared. The extent to which we are willing to hedge against major shifts is 
a cost-benefit argument. Even for some major military powers, maintaining 
the ability to respond to all contingencies is becoming increasingly 
problematic. The critical question, therefore, is how much risk mitigation is 
considered affordable.
17
 
But in fact it is even more complex than that: ‗how much risk mitigation is 
considered affordable‘ depends on how serious the risk is seen to be, and 
how effective different mitigation strategies might be in mitigating it.   
The remainder of this essay will try to explore this set of questions.       
What Might Australia Do? 
It might help to start by asking what Australia is doing to meet the same 
challenges.  This is not to suggest that New Zealand will or should follow an 
Australian lead.  Despite what many Australians assume, New Zealand‘s 
strategic circumstances are different from Australia‘s, and its responses to 
the emerging strategic challenges of the Asian Century will be different too, 
just as its strategic policies in the past have differed, sometimes markedly, 
from Australia‘s.  But it nonetheless helps to consider New Zealand‘s options 
in the light of Australia‘s responses for two reasons.  First, though different in 
many ways, Australia‘s situation is less unlike New Zealand‘s than any other 
country‘s, and our analysis of New Zealand‘s choices may be helped by 
exploring the comparisons and contrasts between them.  Second, Australia 
itself is a big part of New Zealand‘s strategic environment, so Australia‘s 
choices and expectations may have an important bearing New Zealand‘s 
strategic situation and choices. 
Australia‘s response to the strategic challenges of the Asian century is itself 
a complex and hotly debated subject, and we can do no more than sketch 
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 New Zealand Government, Defence Assessment 2010, para 4.49.  
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the issues here.
18
  In 2009 the Labor Government under Kevin Rudd 
published a Defence White Paper which gave great though somewhat 
muddled prominence to China‘s rise and its implications for Australia.
19
  It 
came rather close to implying that China‘s growing power was threatening to 
its neighbours.  It gave prominence to plans to expand Australia‘s air and 
naval forces to meet this threat.  However these were more long-term 
aspirations than serious policy decisions.  For example, while Rudd‘s White 
Paper proposed to double the size of Australia‘s submarine fleet to 12 boats, 
this goal would not actually be reached until nearly the middle of the century.  
Nonetheless the basic premise—that China‘s growing power is 
fundamentally changing Australia‘s strategic situation and increasing its 
strategic risks—is clear, even if Australia‘s response remains uncertain. 
What are Australia‘s options?  There are two issues here.  The first is 
primarily a matter of diplomacy.  Should Australia urge the United States to 
retain the primacy that has been essential to Asia‘s security for the last few 
decades in the face of China‘s growing power, or should it urge the United 
States to accommodate China‘s ambitions in some kind of power-sharing 
arrangement?  This choice is critical in shaping the probability of Australia 
being drawn into a conflict with China, and the circumstances in which that 
might occur. 
The second issue is how Australia would respond if diplomacy fails and the 
US-China relationship deteriorates further.  This would be the kind of 
paradigm-shifting event that New Zealand‘s Defence Assessment warned of.  
If it happened, Australia would have a stark choice.  Either it could support 
the United States, and accept the immense economic costs and strategic 
risks of treating China as an enemy, or it could decline to support America, 
and abandon the alliance which has been the central pillar of its foreign and 
strategic policy.  The choice would depend partly on how far China‘s 
behaviour had provoked US responses and fuelled Australian fears.  But in 
any case the answer to this almost unthinkable question in Australian foreign 
policy is not clear. 
If Australia chose to support the United States then it would find itself drawn 
more and more closely into the US-China strategic competition.  Washington  
would seek larger and more capable Australian forces, more strongly 
committed to support the United States in specific contingencies, and quite 
probably based with American forces in places like Guam or even Japan.  
Australia would therefore not just loose its largest trading partner. It would 
                                                 
18
 For fuller treatments, see Hugh White, Power Shift: Australia’s Future between Washington 
and Beijing, Quarterly Essay no. 39 (Melbourne: Black Inc, 2010); or Hugh White, ‗Power Shift: 
Rethinking Australia‘s place in the Asian Century‘, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol 
65, no. 1 (2011), pp. 81-93. 
19
 Australian Government, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030 
(Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009).   
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also need to spend a lot more on Defence, and run much larger risks of 
being drawn into high-level conflict with a major, nuclear-armed power. 
What are the alternatives?  If Australia chose not to support the United 
States and instead abandon the alliance, it would have four options.  It could 
seek an alliance with a new ‗great and powerful friend‘, opt for armed 
neutrality, seek allies among its middle-power neighbours, or accept the 
risks of unarmed neutrality.   The first one would be very hard to manage, 
the second is quite possible but would require much larger investments in 
armed forces, the third would also require much bigger defence budgets and 
a revolution in regional diplomacy, especially with Indonesia.  The fourth 
would be easy to slip into and thus might end up being the default option for 
want of any clear decision to do any of the others. 
In fact this choice between any of the first three options and the fourth 
seems in many ways to be the most fundamental one for Australia.  
Ultimately decision for Australia is between being a small power and a 
middle power.  Australians see themselves, and are seen by others, as a 
middle power, but that has never really been put to the test.  Australia may 
soon have to decide whether it is willing and able to build armed forces to 
give it the strategic weight of a middle power.  That means a defence force 
strong enough protect its interests without relying on the United States. The 
alternative would be to do as many other countries do, and simply hope that 
the test will never come. 
There is no consensus in Australia about how this choice would come out.  
To remain a middle power in military terms Australia would need armed 
forces that at a minimum could, operating independently, raise the costs and 
risks to a major Asian power of operations against the continent to the point 
that they exceeded any likely benefit.  That is a demanding benchmark, and 
it will become more demanding as the decades pass. Australia‘s economic 
weight is declining relative to its Asian neighbours as their economies grow 
faster.  Australia will only remain a middle power in military terms over the 
next few decades if it is willing to spend a substantially higher proportion of 
its GDP on defence –say 3-4 percent rather than 2 percent—and is able to 
spend it much more effectively than it has done in recent decades.  This 
outcome is by no means to be taken for granted.     
New Zealand’s Options  
What then are New Zealand‘s options?  Like every other country in the 
Western Pacific, New Zealand‘s strategic interests would best be served by 
the preservation of the status quo.  The stable Asian order supported by 
uncontested US primacy has suited New Zealand well.  But if that cannot 
last, New Zealand‘s interests—again, like everyone else‘s in the region—
would best be served by the evolution of a new order in which the United 
States stays actively engaged and serves to balance and limit Chinese 
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power and influence, but avoids escalating strategic competition with China.  
New Zealand‘s leaders should be thinking about what they can do to help 
promote this outcome, but they should also consider what New Zealand‘s 
options would be if that kind of new order cannot be built, and the region 
slides instead into amore contested and dangerous future. 
One of the weaknesses of both New Zealand‘s and Australia‘s recent 
Defence White Papers is that they try to determine military needs before 
considering the kind of wider strategic posture the military forces are 
intended to support.  We said earlier that defence policy depends on 
judgements about the future of the international order, but it equally depends 
on the choices we make about the kind of role we want or expect our 
countries to play in that order.  In the preceding section we have seen how 
Australia‘s military choices will be framed by the kind of role it would want to 
play in a more contested Asia—an active ally of the United States, a well-
armed neutral, a partner with regional neighbours, or a small power trying to 
keep its head down.  New Zealand faces a similar range of options, and its 
defence needs will depend on the choice it makes. 
There seem to be five alternative strategic postures that New Zealand could 
adopt in a more contested Asia.  First, Wellington could restore the alliance 
with America.  New Zealand might decide that the best way to respond to 
China‘s challenge to US primacy is to encourage and support America to 
push back.  Washington would be willing enough to reciprocate, because the 
more intense its competition with China becomes, the more interested it will 
be in expanding and strengthening its network of allies.  We can see steps in 
this direction from both sides.  The New Zealand White Paper is notably 
warm in its statements of support for the US role in Asia,
20
 and the US-New 
Zealand Wellington Declaration of November 2010 shows real enthusiasm 
from Washington to restore a closer strategic relationship for the first time 
since 1984.
21
 
But how well would this serve New Zealand‘s interests in the longer term?  
That depends on the trajectory of US-China relations and the way the two 
protagonists‘ objectives evolve.  The more hostile the United States and 
China become towards one another, the greater the costs to New Zealand of 
a closer link with the United States.  But if hostility grows because China is 
aggressively throwing its weight around, New Zealand might well conclude 
that it would nonetheless be wise to support America as the best protection 
from Chinese bullying.  If on the other hand America contributes to 
escalating hostility by refusing to concede legitimate increases in Chinese 
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 See for example New Zealand Government, Defence White Paper 2010, para 2.22. 
21
 See for example the Wellington Declaration issued by the two governments on 4 November 
2010, <http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/4309206/Full-text-of-the-Wellington-
Declaration%20> [Accessed 21 March 2011]. 
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influence as Beijing‘s power grows, New Zealand might well decide that 
supporting the United States was not in its interests.   
Moreover, like Australia, New Zealand would find that a closer strategic 
connection with the United States in a more contested Asia would carry large 
costs and risks.  America would expect substantial New Zealand political and 
military support against China, and the more intense the contest became the 
more America would demand.  As close US ally in a more contested Asia, 
New Zealand would find itself spending more and more on defence, and 
facing a higher and higher risk of being drawn into a serious conflict with a 
very dangerous adversary. 
All this assumes that the United States will stay engaged in Asia to contest 
China‘s challenge.  It is possible however that faced with the costs of either 
trying to dominate China or balancing it, the United States might instead 
decide to relinquish a leading role and leave Asia‘s future to be sorted out by 
Asians themselves.  If that happens counties like New Zealand will have no 
choice but to look at other options. 
The second possibility would be to seek the support of another great 
power—perhaps Japan or India—instead of the United States.  But alliance 
with any other great power would carry many of the risks and costs of 
alliance with the United States, and arguably offer fewer and less certain 
benefits.  While not to be dismissed, this is unlikely to be an attractive option. 
The third option for New Zealand is armed neutrality—the Swiss or Swedish 
option.  Wellington could withdraw from all strategic connections and 
rigorously forgo any idea of using armed force other then in response to a 
direct attack on New Zealand itself, while maintaining the capacity to defend 
itself independently from a direct attack if it occurred.  It is an attractive idea, 
especially because New Zealand‘s remoteness and natural geography—as 
the White Paper noted—makes a direct attack seem so unlikely.
22
  But even 
with these advantages, armed neutrality would still not be a cheap option.  
As the WP also said, the forces needed to repel a substantial military attack 
on New Zealand by a major power would be very expensive.
23
  For this 
reason, most New Zealanders would probably dismiss the option of armed 
neutrality out of hand.  Nonetheless the White Paper does suggest that the 
NZDF should have some capacity independently to resist direct attack on its 
territory ―sufficient to indicate that to deter a potential aggressor and provide 
time for any international assistance that might be sought‖.
24
  It might be 
instructive to explore what kind of forces New Zealand would in fact need to 
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 New Zealand Government, Defence White Paper 2010, para 2.12. 
23
 Ibid., para 4.37.  
24
 Ibid., para 4.10.   
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sustain a credible capacity to defend its own territory independently,
25
 but we 
won‘t pursue this here. 
The most obvious alternative to armed neutrality for New Zealand is to 
strengthen the alliance with Australia.  This is New Zealand‘s fourth option.  
What this would mean would mean depend a lot on the posture Australia 
itself chose to adopt.  If Australia inclines towards armed neutrality the two 
countries could establish a kind of joint armed and neutral posture—
together, alone. But if Australia stays a close US ally, or builds a new 
regional alliance, then New Zealand would be entangled by Australia‘s 
commitments too.  That might not suit New Zealand, because its calculations 
of risk and cost might easily differ from Australia‘s.  Moreover a closer 
alliance with Australia in a more contested Asia would be expensive too.  
The WP makes clear that ―meeting Australian expectations‖ is already a key 
task for the NZDF,
26
 and the higher strategic risks grow, the more that might 
demand of New Zealand.     
Finally, New Zealand could adopt the ‗small power‘ option—in effect, 
unarmed neutrality.  New Zealand could decide that, notwithstanding the 
increased dangers that loom in a more contested Asia, they are not so great 
as to warrant the costs and risks of adopting any of the options available to 
manage them actively.  In that case the best course would be to keep one‘s 
head down and hope for the best, while realising that if the worst happens 
there will be no recourse but to bear the consequences as best one can. 
This is not an unusual posture—in fact the majority of countries around the 
world are in this position.  But it is not an attractive or glamorous alternative, 
and few political leaders would be willing actively to advocate it for any 
country—and perhaps especially not in a country with New Zealand‘s proud 
military and internationalist tradition.  Nonetheless it is perhaps the most 
likely outcome for New Zealand, if only because the country would more or 
less inevitably slip into it if active and arduous steps are not taken to 
implement any of the alternatives. 
Costs and Risks   
Which option New Zealand should or would choose depends on how its 
leaders and people weigh the balance of costs on the one hand and risks on 
the other.  Both are impossible to calculate with any precision, but there is no 
alternative but to estimate them as best we can.  Let us look at the risk side 
of the ledger first.  How bad are the strategic risks to which New Zealand 
might be exposed in a more contested Asia?  Here the main question is how 
pessimistic to be.  It is a mistake to base policy entirely on worst-case 
scenarios, but equally it is important to recognise how bad things could 
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 A starting point might be the short-lived plan hatched in the early 1980s to replace most of the 
NZDF with a fleet of submarines. 
26
 New Zealand Government, Defence White Paper 2010, paras 4.8, 4.13-4.16. 
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realistically become.  If strategic competition between the United States and 
China escalates substantially—and that is not a remote possibility—Asia 
could face a long period of intense hostility and outright war comparable to 
the turbulent first half of the twentieth century.  While New Zealand will 
always be insulated by geography from the worst of major power conflict, the 
lessons of the early 1940s shows that the South Pacific is not necessarily 
immune from its consequences.  Prudence requires us to recognise that 
comparable outcomes are not so improbable over the next few decades that 
they can be dismissed from our calculations. 
The other factor that New Zealand policymakers should consider in 
assessing future risks is the likely Australian response to the strategic 
challenges both countries face.  Like most Australians, most New 
Zealanders no doubt assume that Australia will always maintain either a 
strong alliance with the United States or a robust independent capacity to 
defend their continent, and thus be in a position to defend New Zealand as 
well.  But as we have seen, that might prove to be wrong.  Among the risks 
that New Zealand‘s strategic policy has to manage over the next few 
decades is the risk that Australia will, by choice or default, adopt a small-
power posture that would offer New Zealand very little if any protection from 
Asia‘s storms. 
What about the costs?  These of course vary with different options.  To keep 
things short and simple I will only explore what seems to be the most 
probable choice for New Zealand—alliance with Australia.  Let us assume 
that Australia does not opt out strategically, but builds and sustains forces to 
defend itself and thus reduce New Zealand‘s risks significantly.  What would 
it cost New Zealand to sustain an effective alliance with Australia in a more 
contested Asia? 
The 2010 White Paper gives some attention to this question.  It is clear from 
Chapters 3 and 4 that the alliance with Australia looms large in its authors‘ 
thinking about how best to manage increasing strategic risks, and that one of 
the key, if not the key, determinant of New Zealand‘s needs for ‗combat 
capabilities‘ is the need to be able to contribute adequate forces to 
operations with Australia in higher-level conflicts.
27
  But the White Paper 
does not offer any explicit analysis of what kind of contribution would count 
as ‗adequate‘, and what kinds of forces would be needed to make such a 
contribution.  The following paragraphs aim to provide at least the outlines of 
such an analysis.       
Helping Australia  
The key question we need to explore here is what New Zealand would need 
to be able to contribute to a joint Australia-New Zealand force in a major 
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crisis in the nearer region if it is to rely on an alliance with Australia as the 
mainstay of its defence in a more contested Asia. 
The first step is to get clear exactly why New Zealand needs to contribute 
anything at all to help Australia.  This is not a trivial question. Geography 
alone ensures that Australia will always regard New Zealand‘s security as 
vital to its own.  New Zealand therefore has little or no need to support 
Australia in order to ensure that Australia does what it can to defend New 
Zealand, because Australia will always do that anyway in its own self-
interest.  Some would say it is a matter of self-respect and tradition.  New 
Zealanders have a deep sense of their place in the world and a keen pride in 
their long history of pulling their weight, and many might feel that free-riding 
on Australia‘s defence effort is just not the New Zealand way.  Such 
sentiments are admirable, and I do not deprecate them.  But when choices 
are being considered with costs that may be measured in percentage points 
of GDP over decades, let alone lives in their thousands or more, it is 
important to consider what might be at stake other than self-respect.  
In fact there are two more tangible reasons for New Zealand to contribute to 
a common defence with Australia.  The first is that New Zealand‘s 
contribution could make a difference to the outcome of a crisis, increasing 
the chances that the combined effort would be successful.  The second is 
that by contributing to a joint effort New Zealand would gain the capacity to 
influence the Australian policy and shape outcomes to New Zealand‘s 
advantage, noting that New Zealand interests might not always coincide 
precisely with Australia‘s.  These two purposes tend in the same direction: 
New Zealand would acquire significant capacity to promote its interests in an 
alliance with Australia to the degree that its contribution made a material 
difference to the common defence.  If these are New Zealand‘s main 
purposes in providing forces to help Australia, then we can set a rough 
benchmark for what the NZDF needs to be able to do in a major conflict: to 
make a contribution to the common defence with Australia that would be not 
just respected and appreciated, but substantial and needed.  This sets the 
benchmark rather higher than the White Paper does when it says that the 
NZDF should be capable of playing a ―meaningful‖ role in an inter-state 
conflict,
28
 and perhaps allows us to be a little more specific about what such 
a role would actually mean.   
What kinds of forces would New Zealand require to meet this higher 
benchmark and make a needed contribution to the common defence with 
Australia?  That is a very complex question, but we can set four broad 
requirements.  First, the forces would have to be primarily air or naval.  
Australia and New Zealand together are never going to achieve significant 
strategic results against Asian adversaries with land forces, and fortunately 
in our region we do not need to try.  Maximising strategic weight means 
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focusing as much as possible on air and naval forces to deny the long air 
and sea approaches to our countries to an adversary.
29
  Of course land 
forces would have a role to play in a maritime-denial posture, and it would be 
tempting to think that New Zealand could make a sufficient contribution in a 
high-level conflict by focusing primarily on providing land forces.
30
  But land 
forces would be marginal to the main action of a maritime denial campaign, 
and limiting itself to a land-force contribution would make it hard for New 
Zealand to play a necessary role.  So New Zealand would need to build and 
maintain some significant air or naval capabilities. 
Second, qualitatively those air or naval capabilities would need to be able to 
operate effectively against the forces of a major Asian power.  This is a 
demanding requirement, as we can expect Asia‘s major powers to be 
operating very sophisticated air and naval forces over coming decades.  But 
the most serious (if not the most probable) strategic risk for New Zealand in 
a more contested Asia is that a major Asian power would try to project power 
into its neighbourhood.  If Australia and New Zealand are to function 
together as a middle power in the Asian century they need the capacity 
jointly to deter a major power from impinging on their most vital interests.  
For New Zealand to play a necessary role in that joint effort, the NZDF would 
need to be able to take its place in the front line against a major power‘s 
forces. 
Third, the NZDF would need forces large enough to take the leading role in 
achieving independent operational results.  It would not be sufficient for New 
Zealand forces to be limited to slotting in alongside Australian forces at the 
tactical level.  Long experience of collation warfare alongside the British 
teaches that to be noticed and needed a junior coalition partner needs to be 
able to fight and win its own battles.  Fourth, and here is some good news at 
last, New Zealand need only develop one or two kinds of capability.  As long 
as it willing to rely on Australia and largely forgo options for serious 
independent capability against a major attack, New Zealand does not need 
to maintain a full suite of separate air and naval capabilities.  It could focus 
its efforts on some quite narrow niches.    
If this preliminary analysis is right, we can reach the following preliminary 
conclusion: to manage the increased strategic risks of the Asian century 
boils New Zealand would need to build and maintain operationally-significant 
quantities of one or two important air or naval capabilities at a level good 
enough to operate in a high-level conflict against a major Asian power.   
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What kind of capability should New Zealand consider developing to meet this 
requirement as cheaply as possible?  We can start be putting multirole 
combat aircraft to one side.  They have become so expensive that even an 
operationally-significant contingent would be very expensive indeed.  We 
might also put submarines to one side for the same reason.  Major surface 
combatants seem more promising, and have the attraction that they can also 
play valuable roles in lower-level contingences.  The White Paper clearly 
envisaged that upgraded ANZAC ships and their eventual replacements 
would be central to the NZDF‘s higher-level combat capability.
31
  
Unfortunately they won‘t do.  Surface combatants have no major role in a 
sea-denial campaign against a major adversary, because even very well-
defend surface ships are too vulnerable to be cost-effective, and the work 
can be done better and cheaper by aircraft and submarines.  Simple surface 
combatants like the ANZACs are very useful for a range of lower-level tasks, 
but it is a waste of money to build large and sophisticated ones for high-level 
conflicts. 
That leaves one interesting and important major type of maritime capability—
long range maritime patrol (LRMP) aircraft.  These aircraft are usually 
equipped primarily for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), but I have in mind 
something different.  ASW is a very expensive and ultimately not very cost-
effective business.  Fortunately it is not important in a sea-denial campaign, 
because sea denial would be undertaken by submarines and aircraft, leaving 
the sea clear of one‘s own ships, offering few targets for the enemy‘s 
submarines.  However LRMP aircraft equipped to find and sink surface ships 
would make a very cost-effective contribution to a sea-denial campaign.  
They would need excellent surface-search radar and other sensors, good 
electronic warfare self-protection and a very good long-range anti-ship 
missile.  Beyond the range of an adversary‘s fighters it would pose a serious 
threat to surface shipping. It would therefore complicate any effort to project 
power into New Zealand‘s part of the world.  A substantial LRMP capability 
would therefore go some way to give New Zealand the capacity to operate 
independently ―to deter a potential aggressor‖ against New Zealand itself.
32
 
The NZDF already operates LRMP aircraft, and the White Paper 
foreshadowed decisions to further upgrade and eventually replace them.
33
  
These plans would need to be very significantly changed, accelerated and 
expanded to achieve the kind of capability suggested here.  How soon would 
it be necessary to start?  The White Paper gives several hints that New 
Zealand might adopt a wait and see approach, judging that clearer warnings 
of growing strategic risk would become evident far enough before the risk 
materialised to allow time for forces to be expanded.
34
  That is a very bold 
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judgment, especially when complex high-technology capabilities are 
involved.  It is worth asking how much clearer evidence we are likely to get 
of escalating strategic competition between Asia‘s major powers and the 
growing risk of a more contested region.  These decisions need to be made 
now.  
How much would it cost?  That is anyone‘s guess, but let us do it on the 
back of an envelope.  Say 20 aircraft as an absolute minimum.  Say $1 
billion per aircraft capital cost, and the same amount to operate over a 20 
year life.  That is $2 billion a year—and these are US dollars.  That suggests 
that for New Zealand to build and maintain forces that would allow it to 
manage the increased strategic risks of the Asian century, it would have to 
more than double its defence budget.  Are the risks serious enough to 
warrant that?  That is for New Zealanders to decide.  I would only offer one 
final thought: Do not assume Australia will take the decisions required to 
ensure that it remains an effective middle power in the Asian century.  
Perhaps Australia needs New Zealand to take the lead on this, to show how 
serious strategic thinking is done.  Time for another bold call in Wellington.         
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